Box 3. Example - reducing Carbon emissions in Chile
(Item a)
In 2014, Chile initiated a comprehensive tax reform,
including three green taxes: a carbon tax, a tax for local pollutants and a tax
for vehicles. This box will focus on the decision-making process and
considerations by Chilean policy makers around adopting a carbon tax, which
included many of the elements put forward in the step by step guidance for
developing a financing strategy.
Chile’s comprehensive tax reform was linked, from the
outset, to broader sustainable development objectives, including to reduce local
atmospheric pollution, as well as carbon emissions to comply with Chile’s
national commitments under the Paris Agreement. The overall financing policy
objectives (Step 1) of the tax reform were to (i) raise
additional resources of 3 per cent of GDP to finance education and other social
spending and close the structural deficit, and (ii) to enhance progressivity of
the tax code. While changes to income tax system were the key pillar of the
reform, it also included green taxes. Such green taxes contribute to the
overall resource mobilization objectives. But they also help align the tax
system and investment incentives with environmental policy goals, by
internalizing the environmental costs generated by economic activity – in other
words, by creating a cost for polluting.
There are many different ways to reduce atmospheric
pollution and harmful emissions – emissions trading systems, carbon taxes, fuel
taxes, removal of fossil fuel subsidies, regulations, payments for emission
reductions, and others can all be used. In Chile, the main policy option
identified (Step 2) was a carbon tax, chosen due to its administrative
feasibility (in contrast to a cap and trade policy), and resource mobilization
potential. Both the carbon tax and the tax on local atmospheric pollution tax
direct emissions – they target emissions from specific liable stationary
facilities (those with combined power capacity of 50 Megawatt or more). (Item b)
This
specific tax design choice was informed by a range of efficiency and equity
considerations that mirror coherence and preconditions checks in Step 3.
The overall tax reform was directly linked to macroeconomic
objectives, seeking to close a long-standing structural deficit (macro check).
With a focus on income taxation, responding to a highly skewed income
distribution, and targeted efforts to close tax evasion and avoidance
opportunities, the reform was also well aligned with Chile’s equity targets (coherence
check). Considerations around policy
coherence also informed the specific design of the carbon tax: its primary
objective was to reduce pollution, but policy makers also considered unintended
consequences and impacts on economic and social objectives. Rising prices of
the goods and services produced by liable stationary facilities could
disproportionally affect poor households, and ultimately impact growth
prospects, depending on the tax rate and the affected group. To analyze the trade-offs,
Chile carried out an analysis on the possible impact of the planned CO2 tax on
consumers (both firms and households). It showed that the intended rate – which
was relatively low and only placed on turbine and boilers within a power
generation above a certain threshold - would result in very little impact on
consumers. In terms of risk checks, the tax proposals were directly
informed by the desire to address risks arising from climate change and local
pollution. (Item c)
Policy makers also considered preconditions and resource
requirements. Building relevant institutional infrastructure is a key
precondition. In the case of Chile, to correctly track and price emissions, a robust
system for measurement, reporting and verification (MRV system) was implemented,
and the coordination between various actors strengthened. Constitutional
constraints also influenced policy design, in particular the prohibition to
expressly discriminate among economic sectors.
Required political backing was secured by introducing the carbon
tax within a larger tax reform. To address resource and capacity requirements,
Chile took proactive steps to build capacity in the public and private sector,
including through capacity building workshops and dialogue with private and
public stakeholders.
Tax reform operationalization
(Step 4) was carried out over a period of 3 years, with the carbon tax
coming into force in 2017, following three years of extensive preparations and
coordination with relevant stakeholders. Pursuant to a reform passed in 2019,
Chile broadened the tax base and is now also working on developing an offset
regulation which is expected to be operational in 2023. While the initial carbon tax was low, for the
above noted reasons, it thus nonetheless acted as a signaling device, and
supported the development of an institutional infrastructure. It provided the
basis for more ambitious steps down the road – a key lesson identified by
policy makers involved in the process. (Item d)
With these measures, Chile started paving the way towards implementing an
Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the medium to long term, illustrating the
iterative nature that also underlies the Financing Strategy Guidance
process.
(a) This illustration is inspired by the green tax
reforms introduced in Chile starting in 2014. However, it does not claim to
paint a full picture of the respective decision-making processes in Chile but
rather tries to illustrate, with a very practical example, how the INFF
Financing Strategy Guidance can help structure decision-making processes to
identify and implement integrated financing solutions.
(b) See for example: Committee of Experts on
International Cooperation in Tax Matters. 2019. Environmental tax issues.
Discussion Note. Nineteenth session, Geneva, 15-18 October 2019. E/C.18/2019/CRP.233.
(c) According
to Kreft et al. (2017), cited by Pizarro and Pinto, losses caused by
climate change in Chile amount to USD 2.6 billion(Chile: impuestos verdes,
diseño e implementación; included in
Precio al Carbono en América Latina. Tendencias y Oportunidades – SPDA and
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2019).
(d) See for example: Rodrigo Pizarro. 2019. Lessons from the Carbon Tax in
Chile. Presentation for the Coalition of Ministers of Finance for Climate
Action.